Understanding the Enabling Design of IT Risk Management Processes by Wiesche, Manuel et al.
 Enabling IT Risk Management 
 Thirty Sixth International Conference on Information Systems, Fort Worth 2015 1 
 
Understanding the Enabling Design of 
IT Risk Management Processes 
Completed Research Paper 
 
 
Manuel Wiesche 
 Technische Universität München 
Chair for Information Systems 
Boltzmannstr. 3, D 85748 Garching 
Germany 
wiesche@in.tum.de 
 
Michael Schermann 
 Technische Universität München 
Chair for Information Systems 
Boltzmannstr. 3, D 85748 Garching 
Germany 
michael.schermann@in.tum.de 
 
Helmut Krcmar 
 Technische Universität München 
Chair for Information Systems 
Boltzmannstr. 3, D 85748 Garching 
Germany 
krcmar@in.tum.de 
  
Abstract 
Although managing information technology (IT) risks is widely regarded as a critical in 
organizations, stakeholders often question the value provided by IT risk management (IT-
RM) to an organization. Organizational research suggests the concept of ‘enabling 
formalization’ to design highly formalized organizational processes. Processes like IT-RM 
that are designed in an enabling way support organizational members through flexible 
guidelines that communicate best practices and empower them in resolving surprises and 
crises during process execution. It remains unclear, however, how organizations can 
implement enabling IT-RM processes. We conduct an exploratory study and identify four 
design decisions for IT-RM. We identify different solutions to these IT-RM design decisions 
and provide empirical evidence as to how these solutions facilitate enabling process design. 
Our results suggest that organizations need to balance rewarding and punishment-centered 
strategies in designing IT-RM to change it from an ineffective, costly, and detrimental 
endeavor into an enabling organizational process. 
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Introduction 
Managing information technology (IT) risks has become a critical part of regulations, standards, best 
practices, and consistently ranges among the top five issues of CIOs (Deloitte 2010). IT risks in an 
organization are heterogeneous and include technical incidents as well as human resource issues in 
software development projects (Schmidt et al. 2001), loss of control in outsourcing relationships (Aron 
et al. 2005), security concerns such as data loss (Straub and Welke 1998), electronic sales strategies 
(Dewan and Ren 2007), cloud computing strategies (Carr 2005), and mobile strategies (Wheeler et al. 
2013). Thus, IT risks are characterized by heterogeneity and fragmentation and cover all 
organizational levels from operations to senior management (Alter and Sherer 2004; Dhillon and 
Backhouse 1996; Markus 2000; Sherer and Alter 2004; Wiesche et al. 2013a).  
In order to cope with these challenges, researchers and practitioners suggest and develop formal IT 
risk management (IT-RM) processes covering all IT-related topics (COSO 2004; Purdy 2010; Rainer et 
al. 1991; Schermann et al. 2014). These processes comprise procedures, techniques, stakeholders, roles 
and decision-making hierarchies to manage IT risks on all levels within an organization (Gemmer 
1997; Smith and McKeen 2009).  
The involvement of organizational members and management are essential in IT-RM processes. 
Organizational members identify potential IT risks, assess exposure, conduct countermeasures, and 
support in reporting IT risks. Management provides a budget for countermeasures and uses IT-RM 
information for decision making. In practice, employees often shy away from the high expenditures of 
collecting and processing IT risk information (Boss et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2012) and managers rarely 
use recommendations of IT-RM in their decision making (Teneyuca 2001).  
Current models for IT-RM process design follow a coercive strategy that does not encourage the 
participation of employees or managers. Based on deterrence theory from criminology, some literature 
suggests imposing formalized work procedures on employees and introducing punishment for non-
compliance (D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Straub Jr and Nance 1990). Consequently, organizational 
members follow procedures only if they believe management is monitoring their activities (Boss et al. 
2009). Otherwise, they use various reasons to justify non-compliance and even engage in workarounds 
or pretend to comply (Alter 2014; Gouldner 1954; Röder et al. 2014; Siponen and Vance 2010). 
Organizational research suggests the concept of enabling process design to design highly formalized 
organizational processes requiring both routinization and creativity (Adler and Borys 1996). IT-RM 
processes rely on the initiative and judgement of both the operational business and the IT employee 
and requires their knowledge and creativity for identifying IT risks and assessing the exposure to these 
risks (Smith and McKeen 2009). As most IT risks occur seldom, differ in their characteristics and need 
individual assessment, IT-RM processes require flexible guidelines that communicate best practices 
and empower employees to resolve surprises and crises during process execution (Adler and Borys 
1996). Thus, enabling formalization allows organizations to ensure both compliance and continuous 
improvement in IT-RM processes and motivates the participation of employees as well as managers.  
We therefore seek to understand how organizations implement enabling IT-RM processes. We conduct 
an exploratory study to identify and analyze organizational solutions that foster enabling IT-RM 
processes. The question guiding this research is: Which design choices exist in establishing IT-RM? 
We answer this research question by applying grounded theory techniques on 31 interviews conducted 
in three organizations (Strauss and Corbin 1990). We identified four design decisions for IT-RM that 
are associated with enabling IT-RM process design and provide empirical evidence for these solutions. 
We contrast our findings with the literature and find two underlying strategies for IT-RM design. Our 
results suggest that organizations need to find a balance between rewarding and punishment-centered 
strategies in designing enabling IT-RM. 
Related Research 
IT risks have been the subject of information systems research from various perspectives (see, for 
example, Alter and Sherer 2004; Dhillon and Backhouse 1996; Markus 2000; Sherer and Alter 2004). 
Markus (2000) differentiates between the systems development and the operational perspective on IT 
risks and used Microsoft’s IT risk categories to illustrate the breadth and variety of financial, project, 
political and functionality IT risks. Alter and Sherer (Alter and Sherer 2004; Sherer and Alter 2004) 
use a work systems perspective to illustrate overlaps in these categories. They structure IT risks using 
the following work systems elements: work practices, participants, information, technologies, product 
and services, customers, environment, infrastructure and strategies. This structure, however, does not 
cover all organizational requirements. Because software development projects comprise technical, 
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social and management elements (Schmidt et al. 2001), IT risk managers who use this classification 
would be challenged when processing different IT risks. IT risks are heterogeneous, inhibiting IT risk 
managers to compare and aggregate exposures of different types of IT risks (Wiesche et al. 2013a). The 
width and variety of IT risks highlight the challenge in developing an integrated IT-RM process that 
analyzes, mitigates and reports on all these different IT risks (Schermann et al. 2014).  
An organization with silos for different IT risks may improve daily operations, but will lack guidance 
on the formal steps of managing IT risks across functions and IT risk information cannot be used by 
executives for decision making (Alter and Sherer 2004). An integrated approach to manage IT risks 
would involve executives in operational IT issues and improve decision making (Markus 2000; Sherer 
2004). Similarly on an operational level, scattered IT-RM efforts cause duplicate work and miss 
methodological expertise on managing the risks (Dhillon and Backhouse 1996; Dhillon and Backhouse 
2001). An integrated IT-RM process supports organizational members in exploiting synergies and 
providing the methodological support needed to adequately govern and use IT resources to achieve the 
organizational goals (Alter and Ginzberg 1978; Sharma and Dhillon 2009; Straub and Welke 1998; 
Westerman 2007).  
The IT Risk Management Process 
The unit of analysis in this research is the IT-RM process. We define IT-RM processes as collections of 
formal procedures, techniques, stakeholders, roles and decision-making hierarchies within the 
organization (Rainer et al. 1991; Schermann et al. 2014; Sharma and Dhillon 2009; Smith et al. 2001). 
The IT-RM process is a systematic, structured and reoccurring process capable of handling 
information on uncertainties in outcomes of technological, human and sociological aspects of 
information technology and thereby informs decision-making (Alter and Sherer 2004; Benaroch et al. 
2006; Hahn et al. 2009; Nicolaou and McKnight 2006; Straub and Welke 1998). Literature targeted to 
practitioners provides guidance on designing IT-RM processes (Gemmer 1997; Marinos et al. 2009) 
and international standards such as ISO 31000 (Purdy 2010), ISACA’s COBiT (ITGI 2005) and COSO 
(2004) suggest formal processes for IT-RM. Similarly, national recommendations, such as the CCTA 
Risk Analysis and Management Method in the UK (1993) or the German IT Basic Security Handbook 
(Ekelhart et al. 2007), define categories and structures for IT risk assessment. 
Commonly, the IT-RM process is structured in phases, whereby each phase comprises a set of 
procedures and techniques to address distinct functions in the process (Schermann et al. 2014). We 
differentiate four cyclical phases of the IT-RM process: the purpose of the IT risk identification phase 
(1) is to identify potential IT risks that may harm the organization. The IT risk assessment phase (2) 
collects all relevant information to assess the identified IT risk. IT risk mitigation (3) comprises the 
compilation of alternative IT risk mitigation measures, decision-making and implementations of 
selected IT risk mitigation measures. IT risk reporting (4) collects, aggregates and reports IT risk 
information to stakeholders. Literature presents a variety of IT-RM processes that differ in the level of 
granularity (COSO 2004; ITGI 2005; Purdy 2010; Rainer et al. 1991; Straub and Welke 1998). These 
differences in granularity can be traced back to the four phases described above.  
Stakeholders from different departments and organizational levels are involved in the IT-RM process: 
IT risk managers, IT department employees, other employees and managers. IT risk managers are 
accountable for establishing a formal IT-RM process within the organization. They do so by providing 
methodological guidance and judging the quality of the IT risk assessment conducted by employees 
(Hall et al. 2015; Mikes 2014). IT department employees identify and support the assessment of IT 
risks in their day-to-day work. Other employees support IT-RM in assessing the business impact of IT 
risks. Managers embed the IT-RM process within the business processes and are the target audience of 
the information gathered during the IT-RM process (Spears and Barki 2010). IT risk managers are in 
charge of ensuring participation of employees in the IT-RM process (Hall et al. 2015). 
Getting all stakeholders involved in the IT-RM process is the key challenge facing IT risk managers 
(Wiesche et al. 2013b). From the employees’ perspective, information generated in the IT-RM process 
is not used for decision making by executives (Teneyuca 2001). Further, IT risks are hard to aggregate 
and compare on cross-departmental issues during the IT-RM process (Iversen et al. 2004). From a 
managerial perspective, employees are often viewed as ignoring security principles and guidelines 
(Boss et al. 2009). Thus, management cannot completely rely on the information provided by IT-RM 
(Ciborra 2006; Wiesche et al. 2013b).  
Despite likely opposition, employees and management need to participate in IT-RM processes. IT 
employees have knowledge of the existing systems and the transformation processes and thereby can 
identify IT risks (Sharma and Dhillon 2009; Spears and Barki 2010). Business employees know the 
impact of ill-functioning information systems and can assess the impact of IT risks. Management has 
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to support IT risk managers when ensuring employee participation. Furthermore, managers, as 
recipients of IT-RM information, define thresholds and decide on mitigation mechanisms such as 
budgets for IT risk reduction. IT risk managers cannot conduct IT-RM without these stakeholders as 
they require the technical knowledge of IT employees, the impact knowledge of business employees, 
and the financial support of management (Rainer et al. 1991; Smith et al. 2001) to act accordingly.  
Enforcing compliance and punishment as forms of deterrence have been found to ensure participation 
in IT processes. Deterrence theory is frequently applied and suggests that sanctions increase IT 
security compliance (D'Arcy and Herath 2011). This theory assumes that potential rule-violators will 
reduce their non-compliant behavior when organizations control undesired behavior. Factors such as 
severity of punishment and certainty of control were found to affect process compliance (Chen et al. 
2012). Computer abuse, for example, can be reduced with detection and punishment mechanisms such 
as providing information on acceptable system usage, disseminating statements on penalties, 
developing abuse awareness programs and monitoring computer activities (Straub Jr and Nance 
1990).  
The effectiveness of various deterrence strategies to ensure participation in IT processes has been 
studied but results are inconclusive. Anxiety, withdrawal, workarounds or pretending to comply have 
been identified as negative side-effects of deterrence strategies (Alter 2014; Chen et al. 2012; Gouldner 
1954; Röder et al. 2014). Other authors found perceived justice of punishment to overshadow the 
punishment expectancy of IT non-compliance (Xue et al. 2011). According to neutralization theory 
from criminology, employees use neutralization to justify non-compliant behavior (Siponen and Vance 
2010). They deny responsibility, consequences and necessity of the rule to justify their non-
compliance. Hence, organizational members comply with policies if they believe their activities are 
being monitored by management (Boss et al. 2009).  
Two Design Strategies for Organizational Processes: Coercive and Enabling 
Formal processes can have either a positive or negative impact on the participatory behavior of 
employees depending on “whether the formalization enables employees to better master their tasks or 
functions as a means by which management attempts to coerce employees' effort and compliance” 
(Adler and Borys 1996). Following the previously described deterrence approach, IT-RM processes are 
formulated as mandatory, flat assertions of duties that do not provide employees with the rational for 
work procedures and do not give them freedom to adapt the processes for their individual situation 
(Gouldner 1954). This type of process design – referred to as coercive – does not support 
organizational members in performing their job nor does it explain the need to participate in 
organizational processes (Adler and Borys 1996). Thus, organizational members are not motivated to 
participate in IT-RM processes and only participate when they are forced to do so (Boss et al. 2009).  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Coercive and Enabling Process Design 
Criterion Coercive Enabling 
Repair 
Highlight 
compliance 
Facilitate responses to process 
contingencies 
Internal 
transparency 
Flat assertion of 
duties 
Visibility into the process 
Global 
transparency 
Asymmetrical 
intelligibility 
Provide understanding of 
overall process 
Flexibility 
Specific sequence 
of steps 
Learning opportunities 
Table 1. Characteristics of Coercive and Enabling Process Design 
By contrast, enabling processes enable employees to get their work done and encourage improvement 
and collaboration (Adler and Borys 1996; Heumann et al. 2014). Adler and Borys suggest four generic 
design principles for coercive and enabling processes (Table 1): repair, internal transparency, global 
transparency and flexibility. Repair refers to situations in which established processes break down and 
the strategies required to re-establish them. Internal transparency is about understanding local 
processes. Global transparency is the intelligibility of employees for the overall value creating process 
of the organization. Flexibility refers to employee’s discretion over the process (Chapman and Kihn 
2009).  
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Enabling formalization incorporates employee’s knowledge and experience and integrates these into 
process design. Enabling processes are flexible guidelines that communicate best practices and 
empower employees to resolve surprises and crises during process execution (Adler and Borys 1996). 
Enabling formalization constitutes a shared understanding of process and is legitimized by both 
management and employee: the process is enforced by management and employee and buttresses 
informal sentiments, initiation and education of employees and management (Gouldner 1954). 
Enabling formalization increases comprehension, rapid response, precision and consistency of 
organizational processes (Zuboff 1988). Breakdowns and repair signals in enabling formalization 
highlight process shortcomings and opportunities for improvement (repair criterion). Enabling 
formalization enhances the employee’s understanding of the process by outlining critical components 
and sharing best practices (internal transparency criterion). The contextual information provided to 
the employee aids his insight into the overall process (global transparency criterion). Enabling 
formalization treats deviations from defined processes not only as risks, but also as learning 
opportunities (flexibility criterion). 
Potentials of Enabling IT Risk Management Processes 
The use of a coercive process design for IT-RM processes does not necessarily motivate organizational 
members’ participation in managing IT risks. Managers cannot assess the outcome quality of the IT-
RM process due to several reasons and cannot design processes that capture all potential process 
alternatives for managing IT risks. According to control theory, the use of formal control mechanisms 
requires the ability to assess quality and knowledge outcomes of the transformation process (Ouchi 
1979; Wiesche et al. 2012). IT risks occur only rarely, differ in their characteristics, and impact cannot 
be assessed in monetary values (Ciborra 2006; Markus 2000; Sherer and Alter 2004; Wiesche et al. 
2013a). Thus, IT risk assessment quality and reporting completeness cannot be judged by IT risk 
managers and management. Similarly, the process of managing IT risks is individually tailored to the 
heterogeneous business processes where the information system is implemented and thus requires 
detailed IT and process knowledge which IT risk managers and management do not have (Coles and 
Moulton 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse 1996; Mikes 2014). 
IT-RM processes would benefit from an enabling process design in several ways. Enabling IT-RM 
makes organizational members accountable for adapting and extending the IT-RM process, especially 
during the risk identification phase, thus facilitating coping with the dynamic structures when using IT 
(Dhillon and Backhouse 2001). Organizational members can use IT-RM to communicate ideas for 
improvement and delegate accountability for uncertainty and risks in their IT processes (Coles and 
Moulton 2003; Schermann et al. 2012). Development of sophisticated IT risk mitigation strategies 
requires employees to be creative and to freely voice opinions (Adler and Borys 1996; Schermann et al. 
2014; Weinstein 2004). For IT-RM, it is essential to use the employee’s knowledge and creativity in 
identifying potential risks to the organization and assessing exposure to these risks (Aron et al. 2005; 
Rainer et al. 1991; Smith et al. 2001; Tiwana and Keil 2004; Wiesche et al. 2013b).  
Thus, enabling formalization allows organizations to ensure both compliance and continuous 
improvement in IT-RM process design. To the best of our knowledge, how organizations implement 
enabling IT-RM processes has not yet been examined. Therefore, we conduct an exploratory study to 
identify, structure, and understand organizational practices that foster enabling IT-RM processes. 
Research Method 
Research Strategy 
We followed an exploratory research strategy and applied grounded theory techniques to analyze the 
data we collected in three organizations (Strauss and Corbin 1990). We interviewed 31 practitioners at 
Alpha, Beta, and Gamma who were either responsible for IT-RM processes or participated in these 
processes and could therefore provide thorough insights on the perception of IT-RM at their 
organization. We consider this inductive approach appropriate to answer our research question as the 
continuous interplay between data, analysis, and literature helped to elaborate on the underlying 
design decisions of particular IT-RM solutions. From our analysis of the literature, we know that IT-
RM would benefit from enabling formalization but the literature does not provide an understanding of 
how to foster enabling IT-RM process. Our inductive approach enabled us to understand the type of 
formalization of particular solutions to design decisions. We followed the methodological guidance of 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Urquhart (2012) for conducting our research. 
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Sample 
The imperative of our sampling was to avoid “research that adheres too closely to a single substantive 
area and, instead, draws from the several substantive areas that are frequently reflected in a given 
daily reality” (Suddaby 2006). For our study, we selected three industries with a long history of 
actively engaging in managing IT risks and for whom IT-RM is a long-standing and ongoing challenge. 
(1) Transportation: IT risks center on issues of organizing supply chains, information visibility and 
privacy. (2) Retail: automation, product data management and retail networks induce IT risks. (3) 
Banking: long-standing IT risks result from regulatory compliance, financial fraud and outsourcing. 
We conducted initial interviews with IT risk managers from organizations in these three industries and 
participated in practitioner-oriented workshops with potential participants. We were looking for 
organizations in our focal industries that invested substantial effort into IT-RM. We identified three 
organizations, Alpha, Beta, and Gamma.  
Alpha is a large transportation company with several strategic business units (SBU). It provides 
infrastructure, transportation and logistics services. Alpha first implemented an IT-RM process 14 
years ago and spent extensive efforts in establishing a group-wide IT risk department with a high 
formalized process.  
Beta sells their products in Europe, the Americas and Asia. Because of its high variety of products and 
services, the organization is divided into several SBUs each of which has its own IT-department. Beta 
has a central IT department to control and support the SBUs and deliver standard IT services. Most 
operational IT services are outsourced to external IT service providers. Beta does not have to comply 
with IT risk management regulations, but started implementing an IT-RM process 10 years ago. Over 
time, Beta has made an effort to comply with IT risk management regulations by starting IT-RM 
projects and hiring external consultants. For instance, when focusing on security management, Beta 
started implementing a process following the ISO 27000 norm. While the established process was not 
accepted within the organization, the SBUs started pragmatic IT-RM approaches and ad-hoc solutions 
for IT-RM.  
After interviewing practitioners from Alpha and Beta, we developed an initial understanding of the IT-
RM process, but questioned theoretical saturation (Urquhart 2012). In particular, we were concerned 
with the many different solutions to IT-RM design decisions at Alpha and Beta. Therefore, we 
specifically looked for an organization with the potential to contrast our initial understanding of the 
IT-RM process. This lead us to Gamma where we conducted a second cycle of interviews to 
substantiate our initial theoretical saturation. We could not find any evidence of endogeneity. 
Gamma is a medium-sized European IT service provider for the banking industry and provides 
banking applications, IT services, IT infrastructure and IT training for several hundred customers. 
Gamma has several SBUs and one central IT-RM department which focuses on collecting IT risk 
information and preparing and distributing this information to the relevant stakeholders. The IT-RM 
department interacts with IT risk managers in each of Gamma’s departments. These department IT 
risk managers are responsible for all IT risks in their department and for supporting the employees in 
conducting IT-RM. Gamma started implementing an IT-RM process 12 years ago when German law 
first required formal IT-RM.  
Data Collection 
Our data set comprises 31 semi-structured interviews with 10 practitioners from Alpha, 15 from Beta, 
and 6 from Gamma.1 The interviewees were iteratively chosen based on their role within the 
organization. In all three organizations, we interviewed the CIO, employees who were in charge of IT-
RM processes and IT employees who had been involved in the IT-RM process several times. At Alpha, 
we interviewed two business experts who were in charge of providing IT-RM budget. At Beta and 
Gamma we interviewed external consultants who supported the IT-RM during risk identification and 
assessment. We asked questions on the IT-RM process, its strengths, weaknesses, challenges, typical 
IT risks and perceptions of the process itself. Our analysis of an interview served as the basis for our 
questions in future interviews. We recorded, transcribed, and pseudonymized all interviews. Due to 
confidentiality reasons, we were not allowed to record four interviews (three at Alpha, one at Gamma) 
so we took notes during the interview instead. However, in all interviews we observed that interview 
partners told us insightful aspects of their work “off the record” and we included these insights in our 
                                                             
1 As all interviews were held in German, we translated quotes and codes for this publication into 
English. 
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notes. We integrated the resulting data set of 236,844 words (514 pages of text) with approximately 
600 pages of archival information into a hermeneutic unit using the software AtlasTi.  
Data Analysis 
We applied grounded theory techniques for coding our data (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Urquhart 2012) 
and used previous work on the IT-RM process and formalization to support our reflection of the data 
and guide data analysis (Adler and Borys 1996; Gouldner 1954; Rainer et al. 1991). We followed 
Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) guidelines for coding the data. That is, the first author read and coded the 
interview transcripts line-by-line using phrases from the transcripts that describe the phenomenon 
(open coding) and tagging similar phenomena with the same phrase. Following this step, the second 
author likewise coded the transcripts independently. All three authors discussed and agreed on the 
differing codes. The final list included 172 open codes.  
We conducted axial coding to link the identified concepts and categories on enabling IT-RM to each 
other and explored specific subcategories among these. We coded for causal conditions, intervening 
conditions and contextual conditions, as well as actions and consequences (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
This procedure took place in a cyclical manner; each cycle of interpretation guided our search for the 
next interview partner. We thereby gained a better understanding of design decisions in IT-RM 
including its antecedents and its perception.2  
Axial coding identified four key categories of the core phenomenon (Table 3). We applied selective 
coding in order to move beyond description toward conceptualization. We therefore limited further 
coding to concepts related to the emerged categories and constantly compared instances of data within 
the same category (Urquhart 2012). Literature on formalization (Adler and Borys 1996; Gouldner 
1954) supported our analysis efforts, allowed us to substantiate our preliminary theoretical 
understanding using the most recently collected data and then apply the types of formalization in an 
effort to understand how specific solutions to design decisions were perceived. 
 Results 
In this section, we present the four design decisions for IT-RM: retaining participation, accountability, 
role, and reporting (see Table 3). We understand design decisions as situations occurring during the 
design of the IT-RM process where organizations can choose between different options. These options 
– or process alternatives – include one or more steps that transform some kind of input into an output. 
Design decisions in the IT-RM process are characterized by mutually exclusive solutions. These 
solutions may address different process goals (e. g., compliance vs. decision making) and thus different 
reasons for each option exist. The solutions have different effects on IT-RM process design. As for this 
research, in which we are particularly interested in the enabling design of IT-RM, we focus on the 
enabling type of formalization. We identify solutions that are associated with enabling formalization 
and provide empirical evidence as to how these solutions facilitate enabling process design (Table 2). 
In the following, we explain the four design decisions whereby we outline the situation within the IT-
RM process and provide an overview of alternative solutions. We first outline coercive solutions which 
are then contrasted with solutions that are perceived as enabling.  
Design Decision 1: Retaining IT-RM 
Our study reveals that a central challenge in IT-RM is to ensure that the process is conducted on an 
ongoing basis. While interviewees reported on implementing ad hoc measures as straightforward, all 
interviewees reported on different solutions to ensure that IT-RM is treated as an ongoing concern. 
Alpha uses formal reporting cycles, schedules and deadlines to ensure ongoing participation in IT-RM. 
IT risk managers can deny the approval of new applications based on the completeness and quality of 
the IT risk assessment of this application. Every application has an IT risk expiration date and is taken 
off the system when the IT risk assessment (among other criteria) is not renewed. This compliance 
strategy allows continuity in reporting and thereby completeness of formal reporting. Management 
and IT risk managers are capable of acting immediately for exception reporting or in the case of 
incidents.  
                                                             
2 Due to space restrictions, example quotes from our data and documents with the corresponding open 
and axial codes as well as data on the emerging themes from selective coding, are available through the 
first author upon request.  
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This compliance strategy is perceived as coercive formalization by organizational members. Employees 
do not see the benefits of the process and thus question the necessity of conducting IT-RM. As a result, 
employees do not concentrate on identifying or assessing new risks or mitigating existing ones. Rather, 
they comply with the tasks specified by management requiring the least effort. Hence, completeness 
and quality of the risk assessments are reduced. The example of one SBU at Alpha illustrates this 
perception:  
„This is seen as cumbersome, an additional burden. We see it as a God-given 
sanction. […] The process […] forces you to think about things. If it wouldn’t be 
mandatory on a regular basis, I would probably do it later … or never. But since 
they force you, you often just comply and do what you are asked.” (Alpha SBU 
manager) 
 
Table 2: The Four IT-RM Design Decisions Identified in this Research 
Design Decision Definition  
Retaining IT-RM The design decision regarding retaining IT-RM occurs when organizations seek to ensure 
that organizational members in business and IT participate in IT-RM on an ongoing basis 
(Table 4). Organizations can choose a process-enforcing atmosphere that results in highly 
documented IT risks, or choose a motivational atmosphere that results in creative 
identification and motivated assessments  
Accountability for 
IT risk mitigation 
The design decision regarding the accountability for risk mitigation occurs when the 
department held accountable for the identified IT risk is identified (Table 5). Organizations 
can choose between an effect-oriented strategy that results in top-down decisions on 
mitigation or choose a cause-oriented strategy that ensures consensus and expertise for 
mitigation  
Role of the IT risk 
manager 
The design decision regarding the role of the IT risk manager occurs whenever 
organizations define the duties and competencies of the IT risk managers (Table 6). 
Organizations can either focus on enforcing compliance, which ensures proper reporting, 
or balance compliance and support for organizational members which results in high 
quality IT risk information  
IT-RM reporting The design decision regarding the IT-RM reporting occurs when organizational members 
report on IT risk (Table 7). Organizations choose between standardized IT risk reporting, 
which ensures comparability of IT risks, and individual IT risk reporting which fosters 
participation  
Table 2. The Four IT-RM Design Decisions Identified in this Research 
By contrast, Gamma ensures that employees understand the benefits of meeting formal reporting 
deadlines and contributing to risk assessments. Senior management appreciates the efforts of 
conducting IT-RM. The IT risk report is integrated in executive information sources and informs 
decision making. Senior management reviews this report with IT risk managers and discusses 
measures and reassessments of IT risks that have not been properly addressed. Then, senior 
management discusses the content of the risk report with their employees. As a result, employees 
sense that their concerns are taken seriously and that they play a role in improving daily operations. In 
this way, IT-RM provides learning opportunities for IT process design and creates flexibility within the 
process.  
Table 3. Solutions used by Study Cases to Ensure Retaining IT-RM Design Decision  
The strategy used by Gamma is also motivational and can be perceived as enabling formalization 
(Table 3). This motivational strategy does not only convince employees to report IT risks in order to 
get top management support for mitigation, but also motivates employees to use external information 
resources to stay informed of potential new risks:  
„My team members […] browse through corresponding sources of information. 
Back in the days, we defined a handful [of sources]: I remember heise.de [one of 
the most successful German speaking IT news portals], cnet.com and various 
others. Some are specific to banking, while others are not. Whenever something 
important happened that could affect us, a colleague distributed the details in our 
knowledge management system and had someone else document it in our incident 
data base.“ (Gamma SBU IT risk manager I) 
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 Table 3. Solutions used by Study Cases to Ensure Retaining IT-RM Design Decision  
Observed Solution Case Criterion Enabling effect 
IT risk information is integrated into 
organizational decision making  
Gamma Flexibility IT risk information provides learning 
opportunities for IT process design  
Senior management communicates IT 
risk management strategy including 
focus topics on a biannual basis  
Beta Repair Encourages employees to identify risks and 
propose solutions regarding certain topics  
Global incident data base for IT 
incidents that occurred in the past  
Gamma Global 
transparency 
The global incident data base informs employees 
of potential consequences, provides best practices 
within the process and fosters interaction  
Decentral IT risk management roles in 
departments are re-staffed every two 
years  
Beta Flexibility Through re-staffing the decentral IT risk manager 
every two years, Beta provides a new perspective 
on IT risks, including individual process 
adaptions, new templates and foci  
Design Decision 2: Accountability for IT Risk Mitigation 
In the mitigation phase of the IT-RM process, the department held accountable for the detected IT risk 
must be identified. Being accountable for an IT risk involves managing the formal process, i. e., 
providing the relevant information and conducting a formal sign-off process. Costs for mitigation 
efforts are usually covered by the cost center of the affected department. At Beta, SBUs negotiated for 
several months for funding a backup network connection between the two main buildings where the 
SBUs are located. The situation was similar at Alpha: 
“As security consultant, the different functional units assign assessments for 
certain IT risks to me. I usually draft the assessment and moderate the discussion. 
This discussion includes myself, the risk manager, the functional unit – or if there 
are more than one involved all of them – the person in charge of the application 
and whomever else is involved. I try to suggest certain probabilities and impacts 
for this risk. Especially the latter enforces a discussion: ‘who is affected, who 
caused this, how could this have been prevented, and so on’. I see myself as a 
detective here: understanding the real impact within this highly subjective 
discussion. At the end, I only suggest a solution […] the most affected department 
will sign the risk declaration and ultimately pay.” (Alpha security consultant II) 
 
Departments affected by a certain risk provide the resources for mitigation. For instance, at Gamma, 
the employee who identifies a risk for their application is responsible for its further reporting and 
mitigation. At Beta, the degree of benefit from the IT risk mitigation project determines the selection 
of the cost center responsible for providing the necessary financial backing. This results in a distinct 
allocation of budget: there is no negotiation and only important IT risks are identified. In the case of 
Beta, the affected unit can often be determined easily which means easy identification of the 
department responsible to provide the budget for mitigation.  
This effect-oriented strategy for assigning responsibility to IT risks is perceived as coercive 
formalization. Employees will be swamped with mitigation efforts and important IT risks will be 
ignored. While those employees affected by the IT risks are held responsible for mitigation, as in the 
Beta example, these employees may not have the technical expertise to resolve the issue. The pressure 
of assuming responsibility for IT risks occurring in the employees’ functional area may lead to a 
culture of deterrence.  
However, the contrary is true: following a cause-oriented approach involves assigning responsibilities 
to the unit that caused the IT risk. Formal negotiation is required to identify the unit causing the IT 
risk and thus responsible for mitigation. In the case of Alpha, each IT risk is assigned to an application 
and since Alpha follows a cause-oriented strategy there is always a distinct risk owner. Because 
assignment to an IT risk involves certain duties and responsibilities, extensive discussions take place 
to decide who caused the IT risk:  
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„And we have to discuss all these issues over and over again. And at the end, 
somebody says ‘okay, I will bear this risk. But should you put something different 
in there and I find out that you are hiding something that we did not talk about, I 
won’t bear [the responsibility for the risk].’ We always negotiate quite a while and 
there are many political decisions involved. […] It becomes more like horse-
trading.” (Alpha SBU IT risk manager II) 
 
Assigning accountability to the function causing the IT risk ensures enabling IT-RM by facilitating 
responses to the occurring IT risks. As all involved stakeholders conduct an analysis of the cause of the 
IT risk, the department ultimately identified agrees to mitigate the risk. This assumption of 
responsibility further guarantees that the most competent employees are involved to deal with the 
system, process or technology where the risk occurs. Table 4 illustrates further solutions to this IT-RM 
design decision that are perceived as enabling.  
 Table 4. Solutions used by Study Cases to Ensure Accountability IT-RM Design Decision 
Observed Solution Case Criterion Enabling-effect 
During IT risk assessment, a workshop is 
conducted where all stakeholders, e. g., IT risk 
manager, business staff, IT staff and 
consultants develop risk scenarios and identify 
proper mitigation measures  
Alpha, 
Gamma 
Global 
transparency 
The workshop character enforces 
collaboration and negotiation between 
involved parties. The moderating role is 
conducted by the security consultant and 
thus enables an ongoing discussion  
IT risk assessment workshops focus on 
identifying the cause of IT risk. The risk- 
causing department will be in charge of 
mitigating this particular risk  
Alpha Repair The involved parties conduct an analysis of 
the cause of the IT risk. This encourages the 
department causing the risk to respond and 
elaborate on a solution for IT risk  
The organization does not assign budgets to IT-
RM for risk mitigation. IT risk managers have 
the competency to provide methodological 
support and the power to sanction non-
compliance through senior management  
Gamma Global 
transparency 
Since the IT risk mitigation costs have to be 
negotiated between the involved 
departments, having no budget for the IT 
risk managers to deal with IT risks fosters 
interaction and negotiations between 
stakeholders  
Table 4. Solutions used by Study Cases to Ensure Accountability IT-RM Design Decision  
At Alpha, Beta, and Gamma, IT risk managers had different understandings of their job. While IT risk 
managers ensure formal compliance with the IT-RM process, enforce deadlines and emphasize 
completeness of reports, they can also support employees in managing their IT risks and develop 
individual solutions for specific risks. We found that IT risk managers prioritize the formal 
enforcement of the process and support organizational members in conducting IT-RM differently.  
For instance, at Alpha and Gamma the IT risk manager values compliance with formal IT-RM process 
guidelines. At Alpha, the IT risk manager puts effort into communicating formal IT-RM process 
descriptions and establishes formal reporting cycles for every new application. At Gamma, one IT risk 
manager identifies his understanding of IT-RM as, most importantly, compliance with the formal IT-
RM process requirements:  
“I will check [the assessments] as precisely as possible. I first check whether any 
signature is missing and then I check for plausibility of assessments. If it is 
documented properly, that means long enough, and if I can understand it without 
having to request additional details […] I tell my people I want them to be able to 
provide every requested piece of information by pulling some file out of the 
drawer. Imagine some reviser coming in and requesting documents… we have to 
provide them as soon as possible.” (Beta group security officer) 
 
Ensuring a formal process with fixed deadlines and content requirements reduces IT-RM costs, allows 
comparability, ensures a homogenous quality and allows management to exercise control. Standard 
processes and methodological support reduce the costs and efforts of managing IT risks by reducing 
duplicate efforts and achieving economies of scale. Resulting IT risk reports are comparable through a 
formal standard for reporting and quality is ensured by strict formal guidelines. Based on this 
information, executives are able to make informed decisions and enforce IT risk mitigation.  
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This process-enforcing strategy is often perceived as coercive. An employees’ focus on the IT risk itself 
might be reduced since he is often confronted with standard reports and methodologically reoccurring 
steps. Motivation to think about new IT risks and rather unrealistic, yet highly relevant, IT risks (so-
called black swan risks) is low. Employees perceive IT-RM as a formal vehicle to provide standard 
information on IT risks. However, there is a chance that they may start to reuse standard information 
leading to a decrease in the quality of assessments.  
While Alpha predominantly focuses on ensuring compliance, Gamma balances compliance and 
support. This is characterized by IT risk managers who value the quality of IT risk assessments, 
mitigation and reporting. While most of the IT risks are still managed through a formal process, these 
managers find specific solutions for urgent, particularly sophisticated or rather unimportant IT risks. 
“Personally, I have my rules of the game. And everybody has to follow these rules. 
No tolerance. But of course, I also support the colleagues in doing IT-RM. 
Everyday somebody needs help. I even work on projects and support them in 
doing IT-RM […] One thing that is so often misconceived is that we can actually 
help: we can improve daily operations. It is not as if we only cause additional 
trouble. Okay, of course we often have to force people to report some stuff, think 
about certain IT risks carefully, etc., but we can also help. We provide experience, 
solutions, foresight and many other things. So we really have to strive to provide 
a well-balance relationship between additional work and supporting daily 
business.” (Gamma SBU IT risk manager I) 
 
Table 5. Solutions used by Study Cases Regarding the Role of the IT Risk Manager Design Decision  
Observed Solution Case Criterion Enabling-effect 
The IT risk manager focuses on ensuring high-
quality IT risk assessments rather than enforcing 
pre-defined processes. The IT risk manager 
discusses individual solutions and (if necessary) 
adopts the IT-RM process  
Beta, 
Gamma 
Repair 
 
Flexibility 
Instead of providing and enforcing strict 
process descriptions, IT risk managers at 
Beta and Gamma adapt processes 
depending on the IT risks and therefore 
facilitate discussions on the IT-RM 
process 
IT risk managers judge the severity of IT risk by 
experience and discussion with business and IT. 
For non-severe risks, the IT risk manager directly 
supports employees in solving issue. For severe 
IT risks, the IT risk manager supports and 
enforces compliance with a formal IT-RM 
process 
Gamma Flexibility 
 
Global 
transparency  
This trade-off provides learning 
opportunities within IT risk management 
and provides employees and management 
with the necessary information on IT risk 
issues  
IT risk managers are selected based on their 
passion for managing IT resources to minimize 
risks and maximize returns including an interest 
in continuous learning  
Gamma Flexibility By their continuous interest in detecting 
and mitigating potential deficiencies in 
organizational processes involving IT, IT 
risk managers provide learning 
opportunities and improve organizational 
processes 
Table 5. Solutions used by Study Cases Regarding the Role of the IT Risk Manager 
Design Decision. 
This content-valuing strategy is perceived as enabling (Table 5). With its focus on sharing IT risk 
content, the process achieves good IT risk estimates that allow informed decision making. IT risk 
managers are seen as valuable business advisors who increase organizational responsiveness. The 
constant interaction and individual adoption ensures an adequate fit of IT risk and corresponding IT-
RM approach. With IT risk managers focusing on individual requirements and a flexible IT-RM 
process, employees see the benefit of IT-RM for improving daily operations and thus deliver high 
quality IT risk information. Employees perceive IT risk managers as supportive and interested in 
improving daily operations:  
“I see [central IT-RM] as a moderator for technological developments and 
perceptions for our organization. Otherwise, we will always be a step behind and 
we would have to invest an awful lot of effort and resources to solve this.” (Beta 
SBU IT manager II) 
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Design Decision 4: IT-RM Reporting 
A reappearing issue across all cases was the type of information that was processed for IT-RM 
reporting. Depending on the different stakeholder requirements, IT risk information has to be 
aggregated differently to be useful in daily operations. At Gamma, employees refer to this as ‘internal 
marketing’:  
“Internal marketing is important to convince people in the departments to 
participate. Why is it important to manage IT risks? How does the organization 
profit? […] Here at [Gamma] the most popular argument is preparing audits: 
when external audit wants certain information, it is helpful to have talked about 
that beforehand, have it documented, and be able to pull out certain reports when 
needed.” (Gamma SBU IT risk manager II) 
 
One strategy to inform stakeholders is to assemble standard reports on a regular basis. These reports 
are formalized, presented to stakeholders and archived. This process compels employees to think 
about IT risk independent of incidents. The formal report with documented IT risks is presented to 
executives on a regular basis to ensure continuity, acknowledgement and a comparison of different IT 
risks. Alpha collects IT risk information on a regular basis on a standardized form which is presented 
to executives at board meetings. While executives at Beta and Gamma reported on challenges in 
prioritizing mitigation due to lack of comparability of IT risks, Alphas formal structure in assessing 
and reporting IT risks allows a comparison of these risks across all IT functions. 
This standard reporting strategy is perceived as coercive. Employees question the practicability of 
comparing IT risks across different assessments in different departments. Certain risks just do not fit 
the provided templates and employees have to be creative to “fit” the risk into report. The resulting 
reports has to be compared to other reports and thus does not allow individual solutions. Management 
therefore highlights the importance of compliance with the defined templates for assessment.  
Following an individual-reporting strategy accounts for the differences in organizational structures, 
responsibilities, reporting and risk culture across different departments. With an individual-reporting 
strategy, organizations strive to fulfill all information requirements. In the case of Beta, dedicated IT 
risk assessments are compiled in management reports for certain issues. As a result, reported IT risks 
are not invented just for the purpose of documentation, referred to as ‘chimera’ by one of Beta’s 
executives, and all identified IT risks are relevant and appropriate for requesting a mitigation budget.  
This individual-reporting strategy is perceived as enabling (Table 6) as it engages senior management 
in IT-RM. Provided with individual reports that meet their information requirements and options to 
collect additional IT risk information if needed, senior management is more likely to provide feedback 
and engage in risk-informed decision making. One of Gamma’s risk managers illustrates the 
importance of top management support for IT risk management:  
“You can do really good IT-RM on a grassroots level, but if you have the feeling 
that management doesn’t really care, it won’t work. The bottom-up reporting 
chain will gradually get worse. If senior management doesn’t care, you have lost. 
Then you can’t heckle the people which is necessary for good IT-RM.” (Gamma 
SBU IT risk manager II) 
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Table 6. Solutions to the Design Decision on IT-RM Reporting and Corresponding Enabling Effect. 
Observed Solution Case Criterion Enabling-effect 
IT-RM offers individual assessments and 
reports in order to fulfill the particular 
information needs to all involved 
stakeholders – especially management  
Beta, 
Gamma  
Global 
transparency 
Being provided with self-selected IT risk 
information and being able to request additional 
reports engages stakeholders in the IT-RM 
process  
Discussions on IT risk reporting are 
conducted across departments on both 
the management and operational level 
Gamma Global 
transparency 
This not only fosters exchange on operational IT 
risk issues that could affect others, but allows 
joint discussions on mitigation efforts on 
management level 
IT risk reports are discussed with senior 
IT management including the CIO on a 
monthly basis 
Gamma Global 
transparency 
Regular discussions foster interaction by 
alerting top management to issues employees 
struggle with  
Table 6. Solutions to the Design Decision on IT-RM Reporting and Corresponding 
Enabling Effect. 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to understand how organizations implement enabling IT-RM. We 
applied grounded theory techniques to data collected in three organizations to identify design 
decisions for IT-RM. For each design decision, we identified solutions perceived as enabling by 
organizational members. Placing value on high quality risk assessments over formal documentation 
and conducting workshops to identify the cause of IT risks seems to facilitate responses to IT-RM 
process contingencies. Comprehensive templates communicating best practices and individual 
discussions on difficult assessments provide visibility into the IT-RM process. Providing a budget for 
IT risk managers, developing individual reports for stakeholders, and regular discussions with senior 
management, provide stakeholders with an understanding of the overall IT-RM process. Adoption of a 
formal IT-RM process (if necessary), the passion and expertise of the IT risk manager and continuous 
re-staffing of the role contribute to learning opportunities for improving IT-RM processes.  
Reflecting on the identified design decision reveals both rewarding and punishment-centered elements 
of enabling IT-RM design. The punishment-centered elements value compliance with the formal 
process and penalize non-compliance (Boss et al. 2009; D'Arcy and Herath 2011) while entailing a 
highly standardized reporting procedure with a scheduled information flow from employees to 
management. The goal of this strategy is to establish an efficient and repeatable IT-RM process in 
order to document efforts requested by either external or internal stakeholders. Thus, IT-RM is 
perceived as mandated work requiring compliance. 
The rewarding elements center on acknowledging employees’ initiative and efforts. This strategy 
necessitates extensive effort in communicating the benefits of IT-RM to employees and relies on the 
active participation of key members of the organization to be successful. Employees perceive IT-RM as 
an important source of information to guide management decision-making and daily operations. Thus, 
IT-RM is seen as a value-adding vehicle for improving the IT organization. 
According to our analysis, when designing enabling IT-RM processes organizations need to balance 
the rewarding and the punishment-centered elements. IT risk managers orchestrate individual IT-RM 
processes comprising both rewarding and punishment elements in different combinations. However, 
we found that across all cases the rewarding elements were designed in the earlier phases of the IT-RM 
process and in the later phases the punishment-centered elements were applied. The example of 
Gamma illustrates this observation: When identifying and analyzing IT risks, Gamma’s IT risk 
managers provide extensive templates and encourage employees to creatively identify risks. When 
moving to IT risk mitigation and reporting, IT risk managers at Gamma moderate workshops for 
determining and allocating mitigation efforts, enforce thorough documentation of risks, and discuss 
shortcomings with senior management.  
These practices indicate that enabling IT-RM requires rewarding elements in situations that are 
relevant for collecting, processing, and sharing IT risk information and requires punishment-centered 
elements for aligning the heterogeneous and incomparable objectives of stakeholders and for reporting 
IT risks. A possible explanation for this phenomenon could be that the earlier IT-RM phases depend 
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on employee creativity in identifying risks and employee operational knowledge for assessing the risks 
(Coles and Moulton 2003; Dhillon and Backhouse 1996). Organizations need to motivate employees to 
participate by outlining the usefulness of IT-RM and by providing rewards. Applying punishment-
centered elements would result in employees fulfilling the requirements with least possible efforts 
(Boss et al. 2009). This situation would lead to IT-RM where only easy or obvious IT risks are 
identified and newer, complex and hidden risks, potential black swan candidates, with a potential to 
harm the organization are not identified (Alter and Sherer 2004; Rainer et al. 1991). In the later IT-RM 
phases, focus lies on negotiating mitigation responsibilities and ensuring proper documentation 
(D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Smith and McKeen 2009). Since additional costs and efforts for mitigation 
are misaligned with employees’ personal interests, organizations motivate using punishment-centered 
elements. Following a rewarding strategy, in this case, would not enforce proper documentation and 
would challenge comparability of IT risks at management levels.  
Our results further reveal the ambidextrous role of the IT risk manager in managing the IT-RM 
process. The IT risk manager appears to be in charge of balancing the rewarding and the punishment-
centered elements. Considering the example of Gamma, this task was divided between two positions. 
The decentral IT risk manager within each department focuses on rewarding elements and motivates 
employees to participate in risk assessment. On a group level, the central IT risk manager focuses on 
punishment-centered elements and ensures timely and proper documentation. In the case of Alpha, 
the IT risk manager combines both rewarding and punishing elements in his role. While the case of 
Gamma is in line with research on the role of the IT risk manager in enterprise risk management (Hall 
et al. 2015), the Alpha case suggests that organizations need to integrate different tasks to be carried 
out by one IT risk manager (Hall et al. 2015). Balancing the challenge of compliance and continuous 
improvement can be enabled by IT risk managers who understand their work as facilitating IT-RM 
through motivating employees and providing knowledge and methodological support, but also exercise 
power to ensure IT-RM continuity.  
Implications, Limitations, and Future Research 
This study advances existing knowledge on IT-RM design in several ways. First, we identify four design 
decisions that foster enabling IT-RM for ensuring compliance and continuous improvement. We 
characterize context, options, and consequences for each design decision. Second, our analysis reveals 
several solutions to these design decisions that are perceived as enabling (Adler and Borys 1996). 
Third, the underlying challenge of designing IT-RM is to balance rewarding and punishment-centered 
elements to ensure continuous participation of all involved stakeholders. Enabling IT-RM applies the 
rewarding elements in functions relevant for collecting and processing IT risk information and applies 
the punishment-centered elements for aligning the heterogeneous and incomparable objectives of 
stakeholders.  
According to our study results, formal procedures, techniques, and structures developed in the 
literature are widely applied in IT-RM practice (Barki et al. 2001; COSO 2004; Keil et al. 1998; Tiwana 
and Keil 2004). The challenge of creating enabling IT-RM lies within orchestrating the various 
solutions – an issue which has not been addressed thoroughly in the literature. Best practices and 
standards on IT-RM should be designed as a collection of building blocks. The important challenge is 
to guide IT risk managers in choosing compatible building blocks for designing enabling IT-RM (Hall 
et al. 2015).  
We acknowledge several limitations to our study. Our analysis was based on 31 interviews in three 
organizations, admittedly a small sample size. Given the exploratory nature of the study (Barki et al. 
1993) and our broad interest in understanding enabling process design, this research presents a first 
step toward understanding enabling IT-RM design. Although we specifically sampled for contrasting 
data, analyzing IT-RM in other industries might reveal additional design issues which would 
complement our results. Beyond the type of formalization, other factors such as the type or degree of 
reward or punishment and the certainty of the incentive mechanisms could provide additional insights 
on IT-RM processes (Liang et al. 2012).  
Future research could examine how the identified design decisions are interrelated to understand 
patterns of enabling IT-RM design. Our results suggest that the IT-RM design decisions can be seen as 
a continuum. It might be interesting to study the degree of rewarding and punishment-centered 
elements with possible influence on participation in IT-RM processes. Future research could study 
industries with other regulations for IT risk management such as automotive or healthcare. Studies 
could also apply different research methods such as surveys or experiments to validate our exploratory 
findings. The application of different lenses, such as goal setting (Locke and Latham 2002) or 
mindfulness (Swanson and Ramiller 2004) could provide additional insights on the design of IT-RM 
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processes. Gamma, in our study, regularly appointed new IT risk managers and each IT risk manager 
had a different perspective, different network and different risk preference, and provided new ideas 
and focus on other areas. This change in outlook provided new motivation for organizational 
members. We therefore suggest future research to study the dynamics of the IT-RM process to ensure 
continuous participation. IT risk managers differ in their understanding of their role and different role 
interpretations affected IT-RM process design and the type of participation of organizational 
members. Future research might study the impact of different personalities and roles of IT risk 
managers on IT-RM participation.  
Conclusion 
In this study, we investigated how organizations design enabling IT-RM processes. We employed 
grounded theory techniques to identify, structure and understand organizational solutions that foster 
enabling IT-RM processes. Design decisions for IT-RM exist when ensuring continuous participation 
in IT-RM, when determining accountability for risk mitigation, regarding the role of the IT risk 
manager, and during IT-RM reporting. We identify different solutions to these IT-RM design decisions 
that are associated with enabling formalization and provide empirical evidence how these solutions 
facilitate enabling process design. We contrast our findings with literature and find two underlying 
rationales for IT-RM design. Organizations need to balance rewarding and punishment-centered 
rationales in designing enabling IT-RM. Our research contributes to the design of IT-RM by providing 
solutions to ensure enabling IT-RM process design and explaining the underlying rationales. Further 
research may investigate how organizations design enabling IT-RM in situations where IT risks have 
not previously caused damage as this could complicate communicating the need for and benefits of IT-
RM. While this research assumes that conducting IT-RM in large organizations requires a high degree 
of formalization, future research could examine how much IT-RM is necessary and identify the 
corresponding degree of formalization.  
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